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Zomick: Attorney Solicitation of Clients: Proposed Solutions

ATTORNEY SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS:
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Seventy percent of the American people lack effective access
to our legal system.' In-person solicitation is one means of increasing the general public's access to legal services. In 1978 the
Supreme Court decided two cases, In re Primus2 and Ohralik v.
State Bar Association,3 that address the extent to which in-person
client solicitation by attorneys is protected by the first amendment.
These decisions came after a decade of dramatic change in the
4
Court's approach to the related issues of commercial speech,
5
rights of association, and attorney solicitation for political classaction suits. 6 Primus and Ohralik were decided one year after the
Supreme Court held in Bates v. State Bar7 that attorneys have a
first amendment right to advertise their services and fees. While
attorney advertising enhances the public's awareness of legal services, in-person solicitation remains vital: It may be the most effective, if not the only, mechanism for providing meaningful contact
between an attorney and a prospective client.
Edna Smith Primus received a private reprimand from the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina and a subsequent public reprimand
from the Supreme Court of South Carolina for advising a woman
that the American Civil Liberties Union would provide her with
free legal representation.8 The United States Supreme Court re1. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, A PRIMER OF PREPAID
LEGAL SERVICES 7 (P. Murphy ed. 1974).

2. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
3. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
5. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
6. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
7. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
8. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 260, 269, 233 S.E.2d 301, 301, 306 (1977), reo'd
sub nom. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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versed, 9 holding that the lawyer's conduct is protected by the
first' 0 and fourteenth" amendments to the United States Constitution. 12
The attorney in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association was
reprimanded, 13 and subsequently suspended for an indefinite period of time,' 4 for personally soliciting employment from two young
accident victims. 15 The Supreme Court held that "the State-or the
Bar acting with state authorization-constitutionally may discipline
a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to
prevent."'16
This Note considers the degree to which the decisions in Primus and Ohralik determine when, if ever, personal solicitation of
clients by lawyers is acceptable. 17 This analysis demonstrates that,
with certain limited exceptions,' 8 the Court is unwilling to permit
attorney solicitation. The last section examines proposed methods
of regulating, without prohibiting, attorney solicitation of feepaying clients.
9. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
10. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.amend. I.
11. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 436 U.S. at 439.
13. The reprimand was recommended by the disciplinary board of the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. at 454.
14. See Joint Petition for Rehearing as to Judgment of Affirmance and Order of
Disbarment at 2, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
15. Ohralik correctly advised the two victims of their legal rights under the
driver's insurance policy. 436 U.S. at 450-51.
16. Id. at 449.
17. This Note does not consider solicitation by runners or agents. For a recent
decision on this type of solicitation, see Goldman v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 130, 570
P.2d 463, 141 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1977) (en bane). For an exhaustive discussion of solicitation by agents or runners, see Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 859, 882-905 (1959).
18. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (labor union);
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (labor union);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (labor union); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (public interest group).
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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF BATES, PRIMUS AND OHRALIK

Prohibitions on the solicitation of clients by lawyers are rooted
in varied sources, including Greek law, Roman law, English common law,1 9 and the widespread belief in medieval society that law
suits are inherently evil. 20 Current restrictions do not rest solely
on historical grounds. The legal community and society fear that
permitting attorney solicitation will result in harassing innocent defendants, 2 1 soliciting by an attorney with connections in the
courts, 2 2 bringing fraudulent claims, 23 "pay[ing] doctors, hospital

attendants and policemen for information about prospective clients," 2 4 overcrowding courts, 2 5 harming clients through "overreaching, overcharging and underrepresentation," 26 and damaging
the reputation of the legal profession. 27 These traditional fears,
28
however, have abated in recent years.
In abandoning the traditional view that solicitation is evil per
se, the Supreme Court required fresh justifications for the timeworn prohibitions on solicitation. 29 The movement away from tradi19. Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966, 969
(1967). Champerty, barratry, and maintenance were prohibited by Greek law, Roman
law, and English common law. Champerty occurs when a person maintains a suit in
exchange for a financial interest in the outcome; barratry refers to repeated acts of
champerty. Id. Maintenance is "helping another prosecute a suit." Id. These prohibitions are briefly discussed by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion to NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 456 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. See Comment, Maintenance By Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 72 (1935)
(medieval society considered lawsuits inherently evil).
21. See Zimroth, supra note 19, at 969.
22. See Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 674, 675 (1958).
23. Id. at 678.
24. Id. at 681.
25. Schoor, Class Actions: The Right to Solicit, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 215,
242 (1976); Comment, To Chasten or Cherish the Chaser: An Ethical Dilemma, 11
SANTA CLARA LAW. 427, 430 (1971).
26. Comment, supra note 22, at 682.
27. Id. at 681.
28. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). Earlier lower court decisions recognize the problems of solicitation
but distinguish occasional solicitation by attorneys from hiring agents for the purpose
of continued solicitation. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677
(1938), modified, 208 Minn. 330, 294 N.W. 461 (1940); State v. Rubin, 201 Wis. 30,
229 N.W. 36 (1930).
29. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In 1967, one commentator
wrote: "The old justifications for the rules of legal ethics will no longer suffice. The
fact is that the Supreme Court has already shown its suspicion of the 'broad prophylactic rules' and has begun to require new justifications for ... the rules against solicitation." Zimroth, supra note 19, at 992 (footnotes omitted).
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tional apprehensions about solicitation and toward empirical examination began with four closely related cases. 30 Each of these cases
represents one facet of the Court's growing recognition that solicitation of clients plays an important role in developing effective
attorney-client contact.
The first decision, NAACP v. Button, 3 ' arose during the
NAACP's efforts in the 1950's to desegregate public schools. The
NAACP sent staff lawyers to community meetings to discuss
achieving desegregation through litigation. At the conclusion of
each meeting, the lawyers encouraged parents with school age children to sign forms authorizing the NAACP to represent them and
their children in desegregation suits. 3 2 When the state of Virginia
attempted to prohibit these activities, the NAACP sued, claiming
that the antisolicitation regulations violated the NAACP's constitu33
tional rights.
A fragmented Supreme Court34 held that the NAACP's solicitation activities are protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. 35 In a plurality opinion joined by three other members of
the Court, Justice Brennan wrote:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique
of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community
in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups
which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through
the ballots frequently turn to the courts. . . . And under the
conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress
36
of grievances.
30. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
31. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
32. Id. at 421.
33. See id. at 417-18.
34. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Goldberg. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring
opinion, id. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring), and Justice White concurred in part and
dissented in part, id. at 447 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clark and Justice
Stewart. Id. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 428-29.
36. Id. at 429-30 (footnote omitted).
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The Court was careful to limit its holding by distinguishing the
37
NAACP's campaign from more common solicitation activities.
The Court noted a number of differences: The NAACP engages in
lobbying and public education activities as well as litigation; 38 the
fees paid to the staff lawyers for the desegregation litigation are
less than fees paid for equivalent private work;3 9 all clients,
including those solicited, are free to withdraw from the litigation at
any time; 40 the lawyers and the organization have no pecuniary interest in the solicited litigation; 41 and the potential plaintiffs are
42
free to decide whether they wish to sue.
Only one year after Button, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,4 3 the Court again faced
the solicitation issue. The State Bar of Virginia filed suit against the
trainmen's union charging that the union had solicited clients for
various local lawyers and had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Union representatives would visit the homes of injured
or killed union members and suggest that the member or his
family consult a lawyer. The representative would recommend a
lawyer screened by the union. The Supreme Court held that the
union's right to recommend lawyers to its members is protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments. 4 4 This constitutional protection was also extended to lawyers obtaining employment through
union recommendations. Citing the first amendment guarantees of
free speech, petition, and assembly to support this holding,
the Court noted that the union is afforded constitutional protection
even if it gives advice about when to hire a lawyer and whom to
45
hire.
37. The Court's opinion noted that, "[m~alicious intent was of the essence of
the common-law offences of fomenting or stirring up litigation." Id. at 439 (footnote
omitted).
38. Id. at 419-20.
39. Id. at 420-21.
40. Id. at 421. This may be said of any litigation, but it was especially true in
this particular case, since the clients did not pay for the legal services regardless of
their financial ability to do so. The lawyers were reimbursed by the organization
rather than by the clients. Id. at 420.
41. Id. at 443.
42. Id. at 422. Arguably, solicited clients always have this choicei except in
cases involving fraud or undue influence.
43. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court wrote: "We granted certiorari to consider this
constitutional question in the light of our recent decision in NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415." 377 U.S. at 2 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id. The Court found that not only were the union activities "within the pro-
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Trainmen extended the first amendment protection recognized
in Button to nonpolitical organizations who gather together and ad4
vise their members about legal rights and competent attorneys.
This holding gives substance to statutes protecting railroad workers47 which would otherwise remain a skeletal, theoretical framework. 48 The Court, citing Button, held that the state must show a
substantial regulatory interest closely tailored to combating the
harmful consequences of the proscribed activity in order to justify
prohibiting conduct within the ambit of first amendment protec49
tions.
Slightly different facts were presented in United Mine Workers
v. Illinois State Bar Association.50 A union retained a lawyer to

represent union members and their families in suits brought for
personal injury or death under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 51 The Supreme Court held that Button and Trainmen
were dispositive of the issue in this case; 52 Trainmen in particular
was found indistinguishable. 53 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court held that "the First Amendment does not protect speech
and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. "54
In the fourth case in this series, United Transportation Union

v. State Bar,55 the union and its members were charged with soliciting clients for various lawyers, 56 limiting the fees of those lawyers, 57 and receiving compensation for expenses incurred in the solicitation. 58 Justice Black, who had written the majority opinions in
tection of the First Amendment," but the State has not shown "any appreciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan to recommend
the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers." Id.
46. See id. at 5.
47. See, e.g., Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
48. 377 U.S. at 5-6.
49. Id. at 8.
50. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
51. The current version of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act is codified
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-.28 (Smith-Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1978).
52. 389 U.S. at 219.
53. Id. at 224. In neither case was there any indication that the union's interests conflicted with those of its members. Id. The majority opinion further noted that
"[als in the Trainmen case, we deal here with a program that has been in successful
operation for the Union members for decades." Id. at 219.
54. Id. at 223.

55. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
56. Id. at 577.
57. Id. at 577, 584.
58. Id. at 582.
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Trainmen and United Mine Workers, concluded in United Transportation that
tlhe common thread running through our decisions in NAACP
v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that collective
activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if courts
could deny associations of workers or others the means of
enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation. 5 9
The trend in Button, Trainmen, United Mine Workers, and
United Transportation is clear. The Court has recognized that action taken by groups to enable their members to find and afford legal services is protected by the Constitution. The rules of the Code
60
of Professional Responsibility must yield to constitutional values.
In analyzing the scope of these decisions, Professor Monroe Freedman wrote:
It might be suggested that the three union cases involved
group legal services, with the solicitation restricted to members
of the union. Although there are references in these cases to
rights of association, other language in the opinions is much
broader. The Court noted in United Mine Workers that "the
First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to
the extent it can be characterized as political." Similarly, the
first amendment does not protect speech and assembly only in
the context of unions or other membership associations. Further,
the people who were solicited in the Button case were not limited to members of the NAACP. 61
Three cases decided by the Supreme Court after United Mine
Workers furthered the developing trend toward permitting attorney advertising and solicitation. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,62 the Court departed from traditional views of the legal profession in finding that the exchange of legal services for money "is
'commerce' in the most common usage of that word." 63 While the
59. Id. at 585-86.
60. See Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv.
183, 188 (1976).
61. Id. at 191 (footnote omitted).
62. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
63. Id. at 786-88.
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Court acknowledged the state's interest in regulating lawyers, it
held that a county bar association violated the Sherman Act by
promulgating a minimum fee schedule.64
Bigelow v. Virginia65 was decided the same day as Goldfarb.
In Bigelow, the Court recognized the first amendment right 66 of a
newspaper editor to print an advertisement for out-of-state abortions. 67 The Court held that advertising is only subject to regulation serving a "legitimate public interest," which must be weighed
against first amendment rights. 68 This decision, in conjunction with
the holding in Goldfarb that providing legal services for a fee is
commerce, foreshadowed a change in attitude toward advertising
by professionals.
Soon after Goldfarb and Bigelow, the Court in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.6 9
applied the test developed in prior decisions: It balanced first
amendment interests against state interests served by a regulation
prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drugs in Virginia,
The Court distinguished Virginia Pharmacy from Bigelow: An advertisement for abortion, such as the one published in Bigelow,
contains "material of clear 'public interest,' "70 while the advertisement of drug prices in Virginia Pharmacy does "not . . . editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political." 71 However, the Court held, for the first time, that purely commercial
speech, without political significance, is within the scope of the
72
first amendment.
The Goldfarb, Bigelow, and Virginia Pharmacy decisions, in
conjunction with the Button line of cases, laid the foundation for
the Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar7 3 which extends constitu64. Id. at 792-93. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
65. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
66. Id. at 818. Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (ordinance
banning distribution of advertisement handbills upheld as reasonable regulation of
distribution of commercial advertising). The validity of this decision has since been
questioned. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 820 n.6.
67. 421 U.S. at 829.
68. Id. at 826.
69. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
70. Id. at 760.
71. Id. at 761.
72. Id. at 770.
73. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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tional protection to advertising by attorneys. In United Transportation Union the Court noted that the Button line of cases stands for
the proposition that the first amendment protects the right to engage in "collective activity . . . to obtain meaningful access to the
courts." 74 In Goldfarb, the Court identified the practice of law as
commerce, 75 altering the way lawyers are viewed by courts. Simultaneously, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Bigelow established that "[r]egardless of the particular label asserted by the
State-whether it calls speech 'commercial' or 'commercial advertising' or 'solicitation'-a court may not escape the task of assessing
the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the
public interest allegedly served by the regulation." 7 6 With the subsequent decision in Virginia Pharmacy, a clear trend emerged. Yet
until Bates, it remained unclear how these cases would affect the
constitutional status of long-standing prohibitions against advertising professional services.
BATES V. STATE BAR

Only one year after the decision in Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court in Bates v. State Bar7 7 extended the right to advertise,
including fee advertising, to the legal profession. Bates involved
two lawyers who advertised their services and fees in a daily newspaper in knowing violation of an Arizona disciplinary rule78 prohibiting advertising by lawyers. Both lawyers were briefly suspended
from practice; 79 the Supreme Court of Arizona reduced the trial
court's sanction to a censure. 8 0 The appellants in Bates argued before the United States Supreme Court that the Arizona disciplinary

74.

United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 4G1 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).

75. 421 U.S. at 787-88.
76.
77.

421 U.S. at 826.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
78. ARIz. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B). The rule provides in pertinent part:

A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper
or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id.
79. See In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 400, 555 P.2d 640, 646 (1976) (en banc),
rev'd sub nom. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
80. Id.
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rule violates their first amendment rights. 8 ' The Court, citing its
decision in Virginia Pharmacy, noted that commercial advertisements are entitled to constitutional protection. 82 The Court evaluated the state's justifications for the ban on lawyer advertising.
These include the alleged negative effects on professionalism, 8 3 the
misleading nature of advertisements for legal services, 84 the possibility that litigation will be stirred up,8 5 a possible increase in legal
fees to cover the costs of advertising,86 the alleged adverse effects
on the quality of legal services, 87 and the difficulty of enforcing
professional standards in advertising.8 8 The majority found these
justifications insufficient to support an absolute ban on lawyer advertising. 8 9

Although Bates established that lawyers have a right to convey
information about legal services, and the public has a right to receive that information, the Court noted that certain restrictions on
advertising are constitutionally permissible.9 ° Restrictions are necessary to prevent deceptive advertising, 91 particularly about the
quality of legal services. 92 In apparent anticipation of the issues
later presented in Ohralik, the Court indicated that restrictions on
81. See Brief for the Appellants at 22-25, Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977).
82. 433 U.S. at 363-66. In further support of this proposition, the majority opinion cited the Court's decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
83. 433 U.S. at 368-72. This argument is based on the view that commercialization will demean the legal profession and erode the public's trust and respect of lawyers. Id.
84. Id. at 372-75. The belief is that legal services are too individualized for
general advertising. Id.
85. Id. at 375-77. The Court recognized that advertising might lead to more
suits, but denied that this is necessarily undesirable. Id. at 376.
86. Id. at 377-78.
87. Id. at 378-79. The majority rejected the view that advertising would reduce
the quality of legal services by lawyers who would otherwise not advertise. Id.
88. Id. at 379. This argument was acknowledged by the Court. "[B]ecause of
the numerous purveyors of services, the overseeing of advertising will be burdensome." Id.
89. The Court stated: "In sum, we are not persuaded that any of the proffered
justifications rise to the level of an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising by attorneys." Id.
90. Id. at 383.
91. "Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to
restraint." Id.
92. Id. at 383-84. The Court also noted that "because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed
unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising." Id. at 383 (footnote omitted).
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in-person solicitation may be justified 9 3 on similar grounds.
The Bates decision, and its predecessors, should be considered
in the context of a growing awareness of consumer issues that affect
the public's view of professionals. 9 4 Yet the parameters of the
rights of those needing legal services are uncertain. The Button
line of cases permits organized groups to solicit, recommend, and
exchange information about lawyers. 95 Outside a group context, the
cases permit solicitation of cases for political ends. 98 In Bates the
Court went even further, holding that a lawyer has a first amendment right to provide information about legal fees to potential clients through honest advertisements. 9 7 The Court, however, limited this holding by recognizing a need for some reasonable
restrictions on lawyer advertising,9 8 and by expressly foregoing the
opportunity to comment on the constitutional status of in-person
solicitation. 9 9
IN RE PRIMUS

The scope of the first amendment protection extended in Button to the solicitation of public-interest litigation was tested in In
re Primus. 0 0° Edna Smith Primus, an attorney in private practice,
had a noncompensatory affiliation with the ACLU. She addressed a
meeting of indigent women who allegedly were pressured to undergo sterilization to ensure retention of their Medicaid benefits.1 01 After the meeting, Primus was advised by a friend that Mrs.
93. See id. at 383-84. The Court stated. "[Aldvertising claims as to the quality
of services-a matter we do not address today-are not susceptible of measurement
or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction. Similarobjections might justify restraintson in-person solicitation."
Id. (emphasis added).
94. See Meyers, Consumerism and the Delivery of Legal Services, 49 CAL. ST.
B.J. 256 (1974).
95. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
96. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
97. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
98. Id. at 384 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). "As with other varieties of speech, it
follows as well that there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of advertising." Id.
99. Id. at 366.
100. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
101. Id. at 415. The medicaid benefits referred to in text are grants to states for
medical assistance programs and are governed by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§
1396-1397f (1976).
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Williams, a woman present at the meeting, was interested in filing
suit against the doctor who sterilized her. Primus wrote a letter to
Mrs. Williams informing her that the ACLU provides free legal
representation for such a suit.' 02 The Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that this letter constitutes prohibited solicitation and privately reprimanded Primus. 10 3 The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed, finding Primus in violation of South Carolina Disciplinary
Rule 2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) because she solicited a client for an organization whose primary function is providing legal services. 10 4 In
102. 436 U.S. at 416. At the time of the meeting Primus did not know if the
ACLU was prepared to provide representation. Id.
103. See id. at 421.
104. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 269, 233 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1977), rev'd sub nom.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). South Carolina's Disciplinary Rule DR 2-103(D)
provides:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that
recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his
services or those of his partners or associates. However, he may cooperate in a
dignified manner with the legal service activities of any of the following,
provided that his independent professional judgment is exercised in behalf
of his client without interference or control by any organization or other person:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-profit community organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists.
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association representative of the general bar of the geographical area in
which the association exists.
(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists.
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or
pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the
time of the rendition of the services requires the allowance of such legal
service activities, and only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by
such interpretation, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the rendition of legal services.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to its
members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of
such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
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addition, she was held in violation of DR 2-104(A)(5) for actively
seeking employment from a person contacted for the purpose of
joining a class action. The court increased the sanction, sua sponte,
105
to a public reprimand.
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Primus argued that her
conduct is within the ambit of first amendment protections delineated by Button and its progeny. 10 6 The issue before the Court was
whether the letter written to Mrs. Williams involves "constitutionally protected expression and association."-10 7 The South Carolina
Supreme Court had determined that Primus' conduct distinguishes
her case from Button on two grounds: The ACLU is an organiza(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in
that matter.
S.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLiTY DR 2-103(D).
105. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 269, 233 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1977), rev'd sub nom.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). South Carolina's Disciplinary Rule DR 2-104(A)
provides:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former
client (if the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the
lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation
in activities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal problems, to
make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if
such activities are conducted or sponsored by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1) through (5), to the extent and under the
conditions prescribed therein.
(3) A lawyer who is furnished or paid by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1), (2), or (5) may represent a member or
beneficiary thereof to the extent and under the conditions prescribed
therein.
(4) Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may
speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so long as he does not
emphasize his own professional experience or reputation and does not undertake to give individual advice.
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in
the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer
may accept, but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the
purpose of obtaining their joinder.
S.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsm rrY DR 2-104(A).
106. 436 U.S. at 421. The South Carolina Supreme Court distinguished these
cases by asserting: "None of the four non-profit organizations involved in the above
cases, has as one of its primary purposes, the rendition of legal services." In re
Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 268-69, 233 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1977), rev'd sub nom. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
107. 436 U.S. at 421.
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tion whose primary activity is providing legal services, whereas litigation is only one of many tools employed by the NAACP to
achieve its goals;108 and, unlike the NAACP in Button, the ACLU
might have received monetary benefits if Mrs. Williams had accepted the offer of free representation.109 The Supreme Court rejected the former ground, stating, "[flor the ACLU, as for the
NAACP, 'litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences'; it is 'a form of political expression' and 'political associa-

tion.' "110 The Court disposed of the second distinction observing
that there was no claim of benefit to Primus, nor any claim that the
ACLU would have received a part of any recovery; the remote possibility that the ACLU would receive counsel fees or indirect benefits was found insufficient to distinguish the case from Button."' In
determining whether the state can restrict Primus' conduct, the
Court quoted Button: " 'Because First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in [this] area
only with narrow specificity.' "112 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, concluded that the disciplinary rules Primus allegedly violated are overly broad. 113 There was no evidence that any of the
evils sought to be prevented by these rules were present." 4 The
Court did not preclude state regulation of solicitation by organizations like the ACLU, but implied that such regulation must be reasonable, narrow, and not intrusive on first amendment freedoms
without good cause. 115
OHRALIK V. OHIO STATE BAR AssocIATIoN

The questions left unanswered by the decisions in Button,
Bates, and Primus were raised in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association." 6 This case involved a young motorist, Carol McClintock,
whose car collided with a vehicle driven by an uninsured driver.

108. In re Smith, 268, S.C. 259, 268-69, 233 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1977), rev'd sub
nom. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
109.

Id. at 267, 233 S.E.2d at 305.

110. 436 U.S. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963)).
111. Id. at 429. The court has discretion to award counsel fees under certain
circumstances. Id. at 429-30.
112. Id. at 432-33 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). See
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967).
113. 436 U.S. at 433.
114. Id. at 434-36.

115. Id. at 438-39.
116.

436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Although McClintock and the passenger in her car required hospitalization and extensive medical treatment, both accident victims
incorrectly assumed that recovery of damages was precluded because the other driver was uninsured. 117 Ohralik, a casual acquaintance of McClintock, visited her in the hospital after obtaining her family's consent. Ohralik also visited McClintock's passenger, Wanda Lou Holbert, at home on the day she was released
from the hospital; he secretly recorded his conversation with her
on a tape recorder hidden under his raincoat.118
After reading McClintock's insurance policy, Ohralik correctly
concluded that both injured driver and passenger were entitled to
recovery for their injuries. 11 9 He offered to represent the two
women for contingent fees; each retained Ohralik as her attorney.1 20 However, when the two clients subsequently attempted to
dismiss Ohralik, he refused to cooperate: He ignored Holbert's request that he inform her insurance company that he was no longer
her attorney, and he sued the driver, McClintock, for a percentage
of her recovery. 12'
After complaints were brought by the two women, the Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme
Court of Ohio found Ohralik guilty of violating Disciplinary Rules
2-103(A) and 2-104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. 1 22 DR 2-103(A) prohibits a lawyer from recommending his or
117. Even if McClintock's state (Ohio) had permitted advertisements of standardized legal services, such ads would not have alerted McClintock to the fact that
she and the passenger in her car were eligible to recover more than $12,000 under
McClintock's insurance policy. The facts indicate that Ohralik informed McClintock
of the uninsured motorist clause in her policy. See id. at 450. Examples noted in
Bates of standardized legal services that are suitable for advertising are "the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, [and] the
change of name." Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977).
118. See 436 U.S. at 449-51.
119. Id. at 450-51. The lower court decision, Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik,
can be found at 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976).
120. McClintock agreed in writing, Holbert agreed orally. 436 U.S. at 450-51.
121. Id. at 451-52.
122. Id. at 453. These sections of the Ohio Disciplinary Rules are based on the
numerically corresponding rules in the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code), since amended to conform to Bates. DR 2-103(A)
of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a
non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." OrHO
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A). DR 2-104(A) of the Ohio
Code provides in relevant part:
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
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her own services. DR 2-104(A) forbids a lawyer from accepting employment resulting from unsolicited advice, unless the potential client is a former client, relative, or friend. 123
124
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Board's findings.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the disciplinary rules in question are constitutional as applied to Ohralik's
conduct. 125 The Court stated, "The entitlement of in-person solicitation of clients to the protection of the First Amendment differs
from that of the kind of advertising approved in Bates, as does the
' 12 6
strength of the State's countervailing interest in prohibition.'
The Court further asserted:
In-person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which speech is an essential but
subordinate component. While this does not remove the speech
from the protection of the First Amendment, as was held in
Bates and Virginia Pharmacy, it lowers the level of appropriate
27
judicial scrutiny. 1
Initially, Ohralik received a public reprimand for violating the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.12 8 The Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed, and suspended Ohralik from practicing in Ohio. 129
He was subsequently suspended from practicing before the United
States Supreme Court.' 3 0
PRIMUS AND OHRALIK DISTINGUISHED

The heading of Canon 2 of the ABA Professional Code of Responsibility states: "A lawyer should assist the legal profession in
fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available."' 13 1 This is folobtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting

from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former
client (if the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the
lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
Id. DR 2-104(A).
123. See note 122 supra.
124. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 220, 357 N.E.2d 1097,
1099 (1976), aff'd, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
125. 436 U.S. at 467.
126. Id. at 455.
127. Id. at 457.
128. See id. at 454.
129. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 220, 357 N.E.2d 1097,
1099 (1976), affd, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
130. In re Disbarment of Ohralik, 429 U.S. 1035 (1977).
131.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 2 (1976).
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lowed by a discussion of the ethical considerations involved and the
related disciplinary rules, sections of which are similar to those underlying the charges brought against Ohralik and Primus. 132 Prior
to Bates, lawyers looked to the Button line of cases 133 to determine
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the disciplinary rules contained under Canon 2. These cases sanction only certain types of
solicitation. Solicitation for free legal representation by organizations such as the NAACP, whose primary purpose is not litigation
134
but the furtherance of civil rights, is constitutionally protected.
In addition, unions may "solicit," either .by recommending lawyers
to their members 35 or by hiring a lawyer to represent workers in
suits against employers. 136 Language in these decisions, however,
indicates that solicitation by lawyers of individuals not connected
with a group is an impermissible means of making legal counsel
available.
By protecting the rights of attorneys to advertise honestly, the
Court in Bates v. State Bar137 helped ensure that individuals
unaffiliated with a group would have access to information about
the availability and cost of legal services. Typically this information
is of limited value because advertisements by lawyers are general
and focus on standard legal services. Thus, they are directed toward people who are aware that they have legal problems. 138
There are, however, many individuals unaware that their problems
can be resolved in court. Legal counsel can be made available to
individuals whose problems are unique, or not easily recognized as
legal, only if they are contacted by lawyers. The Court in Bates left
unresolved the issue of in-person solicitation. 139 The Courts subse-

132. Compare ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A), (D)

and DR 2-104(A) with OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A)
and DR 2-104(A); S.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONXL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D) and
DR 2-104(A).

133. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-

men v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963).
134. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
135. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
136. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
137. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
138. The Court in Bates briefly discussed the types of legal services that are
suitable for advertising. Id. at 372. See note 117 supra.
139. 436 U.S. at 366.
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quent decisions, 140 particularly Ohralik, indicate that although
Bates altered the status of attorney advertising, in-person solicitation for a fee was not affected.141 The Ohralik Court took pains to
42
distinguish that case from the Button line of cases. 1
The Court extended to Primus the same protection it provided
the NAACP's activities in NAACP v. Button 14 3 because Primus'
conduct on behalf of the ACLU constituted "political expression" as
defined in Button. 144 This protection, provided for conduct within
the "zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational
freedoms,"' 14 5 ensures that state regulation is narrow and promotes
a compelling interest; such regulation is subject to strict scrutiny
by the courts. 14 6 The Court acknowledges that the state has valid
reasons for regulating lawyers, but disciplinary actions affecting
protected political expression must be based on actual, rather than
14 7
potential, harms.
140. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978).
141. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 454-55. Before Bates, the final
word on solicitation was expressed in the holding of United Transp. Union v. State
Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971), which allows unions to solicit clients for lawyers selected
by the unions as part of the right to take collective action to achieve access to the
courts. No mention was made of the right of unaffiliated individuals to gain access to
the courts through solicitation by lawyers. Id. at 585.
142. The Court in Ohralik distinguished Ohralik's conduct from that in the union cases by asserting: "Nor can [Ohralik] compare his solicitation to the mutual assistance in asserting legal rights that was at issue in United Transportation . . . ,
Mine Workers . . . and Railroad Trainmen .....
436 U.S. at 458-59 (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 431.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 432. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where
Chief Justice Warren wrote:
This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the
governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety
of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear
that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
147. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38.
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Ohralik was distinguished from Primus on the ground that
Ohralik's conduct involved commercial speech, whereas Primus engaged in political expression. 148 On the basis of this distinction, the
Court determined that Ohralik's activities deserved less protection
than those of Primus. 149 Therefore, potential dangers may be sufficient to justify disciplinary proceedings for in-person solicitation
50
involving a fee. 1

Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion to Primus and
Ohralik, recognizes that these cases present two extreme examples

of the problems raised by solicitation of legal clients. 151 Most solici-

tations fall in the middle range not directly addressed by the
Court. An example is nonmisleading solicitation of a potential client who is able to decide rationally whether to retain the services
of the soliciting attorney. 152 Justice Marshall believes that solicitation in such a case may serve a purpose similar to advertising by
increasing consumer knowledge about legal services. 153 This led
Justice Marshall to conclude: "The First Amendment informational
interests served by solicitation, whether or not it occurs in a purely
commercial context, are substantial, and they are entitled to as
much protection as the interests we found to be protected in
54

Bates."1

While Justice Marshall agrees with the assertion in Ohralik
that the state's interest in regulating in-person solicitation may be
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Obralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 467. However, "[i]n the context of political expression and association . ..a State must regulate with significantly greater precision." In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38 (footnote omitted).
151. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment (opinion applies also to Primus).
152. Id. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(opinion applies also to Primus). Justice Marshall noted further that an "attorney may
personally solicit business 'where he does not take advantage of the ignorance, or
weakness, or suffering, or human frailties of the expected clients, and where no inducements are offered them."' Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (opinion applies also to Primus) (quoting Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard,
282 Ky. 734, 739, 139 S.W.2d 773, 775 (1940)).
153. "Like rules against advertising, rules against solicitation substantially
impede the flow of important information to consumers from those most likely to
provide it--the practicing members of the Bar." Id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (opinion applies also to Primus). One commentator
advances a similar argument: "[S]olicitation will increase the flow of information to
those who would not otherwise have had the knowledge or opportunity to redress
their grievances." Schoor, supra note 25, at 243.
154. 436 U.S. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (opinion applies also to Primus).
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greater than its interest in regulating advertising, he maintained
that a blanket proscription against solicitation for a fee is not appropriate. 155 Such a ban, Justice Marshall argued, discriminates
against poor consumers and against lawyers practicing alone or in
small firms. 156 Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment in
Ohralik because he found sufficient dangers presented by the facts
of the case to justify disciplinary action. 157
After Ohralik, a lawyer might be overly cautious in considering whether to solicit clients for monetary gain, even when that decision results in the forfeiture of an opportunity to correct a legal
wrong. While the decision in Bates, and Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Ohralik, indicate a trend towards careful scrutiny of
the current validity of certain sections of professional codes of conduct, the Supreme Court has not yet extended constitutional protection to in-person solicitation for a fee outside a union context.
Indeed, language in Ohralik suggests that the Supreme Court will
permit states to regulate or prohibit commercial solicitation on the
basis of potential, rather than actual, dangers.1 5 8
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Justice Marshall's position that solicitation is often in the public interest' 5 9 may gain judicial support. The bar and courts can
create guidelines and regulations that permit solicitation while preventing potential abuse. This section discusses proposed methods
for achieving this result.' 6 0 These proposals are not mutually exclu155.

Id. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)

(opinion applies also to Primus).
156. Id. at 475 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(opinion applies also to Primus). See B. CRISTENSEN, LAwYERS FOR PEOPLE OF
MODERATE MEANS 136 (1970).
157. 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (opinion applies also to Primus). "What is objectionable about Ohralik's behavior here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he
accomplished it." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(opinion applies also to Primus).
158. See id. at 467.
159. See id. at 468 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(opinion applies also to Primus).
160. A number of commentators have examined these and other proposed
amendments to Canon 2. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 60; Smith, Making the
Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62 A.B.A.J. 855, 861 (1976); Zimroth,
supra note 19; Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys
and Advertising, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 77, 101-03 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Attorneys and Advertising]; Comment, supra note 25, at 435-38; Comment, Adverts-
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sive; in combination they could protect the public from potential
evils of in-person solicitation by lawyers without a total ban.
A potential abuse that can result from permitting solicitation is
that a lawyer, trained in the art of persuasion, would have too
great an influence on a potential client who has not yet decided to
bring suit. This problem could be mitigated by providing a coolingoff period for solicited clients who have signed contracts. 161 This
could follow the pattern of state regulations that allow purchasers
of goods from door-to-door salespeople to cancel their contracts
within three days of the sale. 162 Such a regulation would restore
the power balance between a convincing attorney and a potential
client who needs time to think about a decision as important as selecting a lawyer.
An additional problem posed by permitting attorney solicitation is the invasion of privacy caused by the possible multitude of
lawyers contacting potential clients. This potential problem could
be avoided by only permitting lawyers to solicit clients by sending
one letter in the mail; personal or telephone contact would be prohibited until the client contacts the lawyer. 163 The minimal invasion of privacy that might occur' 64 is outweighed by the importance of informing individuals of possible legal solutions to their
problems. Potential abuses can be controlled in two ways: Judges
could dismiss frivolous cases and hold the lawyers who solicited the
cases liable for the costs incurred by both parties, and there could
ing, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81

YALJE L.J. 1181, 1192-1201 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available].
161. See Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, supra note 160, at 1200.
162. Id. & n.115. The commentator cites N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAw §§ 425-431
(McKinney Supp. 1977).
163. Support for distinguishing in-person solicitation from solicitation by mail
is found in the Court's recent decisions in Primus and Ohralik. In Ohralik, the majority opinion noted that "[t]he solicitation of business by a lawyer through direct,
in-person communication with the prospective client has long been viewed as ...
posing a significant potential for harm to the prospective client." 436 U.S. at 454.
However, in the case of Primus, whose alleged violation of the state's disciplinary
rules involved writing a letter to a potential client, the Court concluded that "South
Carolina's application of its Disciplinary Rules... to appellant's solicitation by letter
on behalf of the ACLU violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 436 U.S. at
439. There are other crucial factors distinguishing the two cases, such as solicitation
for a fee in contrast to solicitation by a non-profit organization; but it is apparent that
the Court has recognized a distinction betveen in-person solicitation and written solicitation.
164. For example, the possibility remains that dozens of letters will be sent to
the victim of a much publicized crime or accident.
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be a requirement that lawyers state the sources of their information
when soliciting clients. The latter would give potential clients a basis for determining whether they wish to contact the lawyer who
16 5
has written to them.
If in-person solicitation is permitted, it will be necessary to address ethical problems raised by solicitation of clients at funeral
parlors, cemeteries, hospitals, and other places where people are
generally distraught.16 6 It is in the public interest to prohibit solicitation in any circumstance that would constitute a gross and offensive invasion of privacy or result in potential undue influence. Solicitation of accident victims or their families at hospital emergency
rooms or funerals should be proscribed. One commentator has proposed prohibiting solicitation of hospitalized potential litigants unless the lawyer obtains permission from the patient's family,
friends, or doctor. 16 7 This proposal, standing alone, does not offer
adequate protection of hospital patients, who alone should determine which attorneys may visit them. Patients incapable of making
that initial decision are probably incapable of selecting an attor8
ney. 16
Guidelines regulating solicitation by attorneys must address
the unwillingness of a lawyer who has solicited a client to subsequently increase the legal services provided and consequently raising the cost. 1 69 This reluctance is based on a "fear of being accused
of employing bait and switch tactics."' 1 70 This potential problem
may be partially abated by requiring attorneys initially to give a
written estimate of the costs that may be incurred. A lawyer should
further indicate whether the amount and cost of required services
are predictable in a particular case.
It also has been argued that solicitation will stir up litigation. 117 1 However, solicitation might be restricted in cases where it
165. If a mutual friend were the source of the information, the client would
then know someone with whom he or she could verify the lawyer's honesty and reputation.
166. See Brief For the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 8 n.2,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

167. See Zimroth, supra note 19, at 982-83.
168. Other potential problems connected with this proposal include difficulties
in determining who may give visiting rights in each case and attempted pay-offs of

doctors.
169. See Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 15, Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

170. Id.
171. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375-77 (1977).
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would not be in the public interest to permit active solicitation. 17 2
For example, it is arguably not in the public interest to permit lawyers to solicit divorce suits. More importantly, solicitation serves
no purpose when a legal solution, such as divorce, is already well
known to the public.
Protection of laymen from the pressure tactics of attorneys
seeking to represent them must be afforded consideration in any
professional code or judicial decision permitting solicitation. Substantial protection would be achieved by permitting solicited legal
contracts to be voided at any time by the client or at the discretion
of the court. To prevent client abuse of this privilege, lawyers
could be permitted to recover in quantum meruit for services
rendered if they could prove they acted in good faith. This regulation could be combined with the proposed rule permitting solicitation by letter only. Although these regulations may discourage
some lawyers from soliciting clients, they offer effective protection
to consumers while permitting the dissemination of information regarding legal services.
Any regulatory scheme is more difficult to enforce than the
present total prohibition of in-person solicitation for a fee. Furthermore, even if a regulatory scheme is instituted, it is possible that
the regulations would be difficult to administer and that courts, to
expedite cases through already crowded calendars, would strictly
interpret the regulations against lawyers who solicit clients. This
result is tantamount to a total prohibition and would effectively
subvert any attempt to permit in-person solicitation. However, as
one commentator noted, "the rewards of success seem great
173
enough at least for us to make an effort."
CONCLUSION

In deciding Primus and Ohralik consistently with the Button
line of cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that, for the present
time at least, it will not pioneer any changes in the regulation of
in-person solicitation for a fee. This may change, particularly if a
lawyer who commits no other violations of the Code of Professional
Conduct174 and is unaffiliated with a political group or union tests
172. See Zimroth, supra note 19, at 982-83. It should be noted that the determination of which suits are in the public interest and which are not would be an exceedingly difficult task, possibly leading to further litigation.
173. Id. at 983.
174. Ohralik committed ethical breaches other than solicitation, including making secret recordings of conversations with potential clients and holding Holbert to
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the constitutional validity of the disciplinary rules of Canon 2 by
soliciting a client.
Canon 2 does not prevent a lawyer from advising someone to
seek legal services. It only prohibits accepting paid employment
stemming from unsolicited advice. 17 5 This prohibition may discourage all but the most public-interest oriented lawyers from offering
advice to laymen. In seeking to encourage lawyers to "assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available,"'176 even if subsequent employment is impossible, the Bar and
the courts must remember that most attorneys practice to earn
fees. 177 Ohralik's disbarment 178 indicates a persistent unwillingness
to recognize this.
A study conducted by the American Bar Association found that
the legal system is generally inaccessable to seventy percent of the
American public. 179 Permitting solicitation could reduce this figure. Courts must recognize that there is a public interest in
ensuring that everyone has meaningful access to the courts,
including a person whose case is not based on constitutional rights
or who is not a member of an organized group. 180 The guarantee of
due process has no meaning without such access.181 There must be
recognition that in-person solicitation by lawyers is a valid method
for reaching individuals who lack information about legal remedies.
State Bars should consider responsible proposals that provide
methods-short of a total ban on solicitation-for protecting the
82
public against potential evils of solicitation. 1
their oral agreement, even though she made it clear the next day that she did not
want to use Ohralik's services. See Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). See also 436 U.S. at 469-70 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (opinion applies also to Primus).
175. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A), (D); id. DR
2-104(A).
176. Id. Canon 2.
177. The Court has acknowledged this to some extent in the Bates decision.
However, this should be a consideration in areas other than advertising.
178. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 220, 357 N.E.2d 1097,
1099 (1976), aff-d, 436 U.S. 447 (1976).
179. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 1, at 7.

180. Limited recognition of the right to gain access to the courts was demonstrated in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), in which the Court held that
access to courts for a divorce cannot be denied on the basis of inability to pay court
fees. Id. at 383. But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (denying indigent's claim to discharge in bankruptcy without paying court fees).
181. See Attorneys and Advertising, supra note 160, at 93.
182. Advertising as permitted in Bates is a first step in preventing some of
these potential dangers. Advertisements will lead to greater consumer awareness of
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As long as litigation remains a primary method of resolving
disputes, 1 83 courts must recognize that all citizens, including the
uneducated and the poor, have a right to know about legal solutions to their problems. As long as there are people ignorant of the
law or lacking access to lawyers, courts must be flexible in weighing and testing proposals. Regulated solicitation by lawyers is necessary for furthering the public's education and awareness if the
public is to have effective access to the legal system.
Nomi N. Zomick
the availability of legal services, which should decrease the possibility that unscrupulous lawyers will successfully solicit cases not in the clients' interest.
183. See Attorneys and Advertising, supra note 160, at 91. See B. CRISTENSEN,
supra note 156:
[T]he conditions of increasingly complex urban life cause the individual to
encounter more and more situations calling for the kind of help lawyers are
equipped to give. With ever-larger numbers of people living close to one another, the fundamental business of getting along together becomes more difficult; as a result, interpersonal problems and disputes tend to increase in
frequency and consequence. In addition, the growing involvement of the individual with large nongovernmental institutions-employers, labor unions,
insurance companies, credit agencies, and the like-further expands the potential for conflict and increases the need for professional guidance in the
systematic adjustment of differences. A third factor is the continuing expansion of governmental regulation of individual activities.
Id. at 132.
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